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Abstract 
This chapter sheds light on the family law debate in Palestine following the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority (1994). It elaborates on the public debate and political contestation over attempts 
to reform the ‘Islamic’ family law during the second half of the 1990s. It describes and analyzes the 
various positions, articulations and styles of argumentation adopted by many actors involved in the 
debate. In Palestine, as in other Muslim-majority countries, diverging assumptions about the role of the 
shar’ia, Islam and gender were put forward as expressions of the ‘social will’ that each group claimed to 
represent. The paper analyzes the deep divisions that split Palestinians over conceptualizing the desired 
gender relations organized by the reformed family law, including its procedures and institutional 
organization. 
Introduction  
Unlike today’s atmosphere in which pessimism is prevailing in the Palestinian territories, in the second 
half of 1990s Palestinians were optimistic; somehow confident that they are about to harvest the first 
intifada’s sacrifices. With the establishment of the national authority in 1994, Palestinians were hopeful 
that they will finally be able to focus on their internal ‘social’ problems including gender issues. It was in 
this context that Palestinian women’s movement took the lead in campaigning for family law reform as 
part of the state-building project anticipated after the signing of the Oslo agreements between the PLO 
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and Israel in 1993, which led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA). This initiative of 
the women’s movement triggered various reactions from different political and social groups, which led 
to intense discussion of family law in the public sphere to the point that it was defined as the first major 
social debate in Palestinian history. In comparison with other Arab and Muslim countries, the 
discussion about family law in Palestine is not unique. In all these countries, the debate has been based 
on struggle for power and hegemony. The Moroccan, Egyptian, Iranian and Yemeni debates of the 
1990s focused on the place of Islam, the sharī‘a and religion in the lives of people and on determining 
who could claim the right to exercise ijtihād (independent reasoning).1  They also referred to the notions 
of national and cultural authenticity and the ways in which various expressions of traditionalism and 
modernism are contested. All these elements are to be found in Palestine as well. 
 
The debate on family law in Palestine presents certain similarities with those underway in other parts in 
the Arab world, in that personal status is used by many political actors to further their interests and gain 
power. For instance, when a project for family law reform was tabled in the Legislative Assembly in 
1997, it elicited hostile reactions from the Islamist members. Their discourse, despite contextual 
differences, showed many resemblances to the Islamist discourses from other Arab countries. Similarly, 
the religious establishment, fearing to lose influence over sharī‘a courts, launched attacks on the 
women’s movement activists, linking them with the ‘West’ and the ‘conspiracy against Islam’. One 
distinct feature of the debate in Palestine is that it originates in the context of an on-going struggle for 
liberation and state-building, whereas in other Arab countries it was debated in the context of escalating 
tension between an already established state and emerging civil society.  
 
This chapter presents the various issues at stake, beginning with a brief discussion of the political 
context in which family law debate took place in Palestine. Then the subsequent section will provide 
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details about the Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (MP), which was the climactic event of 
the debate. The chapter ends with concluding remarks.  
 
Political Context of the Debate in Palestine 
The process of state-building in Palestine counts as one of the most complex experiences in Third 
World history. The Palestinian Authority (PA), created after the signing of the Oslo agreements in 1993, 
lacks independence, sovereignty and control over its borders and resources. Even in those disconnected 
areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that are formally under its control, the PA’s power is largely 
hampered by Israeli restrictions over the movement of individuals and goods, by the Israeli right – 
stipulated in the Oslo agreements – to supervise security in most areas and by the presence of hundreds 
of thousands of hostile Jewish settlers on Palestinian land, whose numbers continue to increase 
steadily.2 
 
The situation is worsened by the PA’s lack of previous experience in governance, the undemocratic 
political structure and the presence of a strong Islamist opposition. These deficits are combined with a 
severe shortage of natural resources and extreme economic dependency on Israel and the international 
donor community. The hostilities since 2000 show that signing a ‘peace accord’ on paper without 
establishing justice on the ground easily enables the iron fist of the powerful to prevail. As Hammami 
and Hilal (2001) observe, Israel now enjoys control over Palestinian public funds and hampers 
Palestinian workers’ access to the Israeli labour market while fragmenting the occupied territories into 
dozens of encircled areas. Thus, it has made the PA’s ability to practise self-rule, or even to carry out its 
assigned job as guarantor of Israeli security, a virtually impossible task.  
The debate on family law began during the first years after the Oslo agreements. A central feature of 
Palestinian politics during that period was that while many Palestinians were enthusiastically debating 
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the laws and challenging their newly established government on the basis of equal citizenship, they were 
aware of the framework on which their new reality was being constructed, namely agreements which 
deprived them of their fundamental right to self-determination and independence; which approved and 
sustained their inequality with Israel; and which, by virtue of being signed by Palestinian representatives 
and approved by the international community, was a written surrender and acceptance of the unequal 
relation with the state of Israel.  
Furthermore, the PA’s discourse since the signing of the Oslo agreements has increasingly focused on 
negotiation at the expense of resistance, thus delegitimizing the resistance-based discourse of Islamists. 
The negotiation discourse has portrayed the Israeli abuses of Palestinians’ human rights as mere 
violations of the peace process. Islamists, on the other hand, view the PA as no more than guardians of 
Israel’s security (Sh’hada 1999). Avoiding the discourse of rights, as Welchman et al. (2002) argue, 
weakened the legitimacy of the emerging authority and made both the PA’s search for legitimacy and 
Islamist opposition based on rights credible. This influenced the responses of these two players on the 
gender issue, particularly in the field of family law.  
 
The post-Oslo political circumstances created a contradictory environment for the women’s 
movement.3 On the one hand, there was a conducive atmosphere; nationalists continued to recognize 
the role of the women’s movement as vital; it was still the most active social movement (Hammami and 
Johnson 1999: 319). The project of a Palestinian ‘state’ was still in the making and there was thus room 
for negotiating gender; laws were being drafted and therefore social groups could lobby for change. On 
the other hand, the Palestinian Authority as an administrative body lacked power and resources; thus, 
the struggle for independence and self-determination remained the top priority. The likelihood of 
political compromises between the strong conservative Islamist movement and the Palestinian 
Authority at the expense of the gender issue was a real concern.  It was these contradictory 
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circumstances that provided the political opportunity for the women’s movement to initiate 
programmes and activities for legal reform (Abdulhadi 1998, Welchman et al. 2002). It raised issues 
related to equal citizenship at a time when the nationalist movement was at its ‘lowest ebb’ (Abdulhadi 
1998: 661). The latter’s failure to address issues related to social rights, democracy and freedom of 
speech was striking (Hammami and Johnson 1999: 319). The nationalist movement had faced severe 
setbacks abroad since the early 1980s due to the PLO’s military defeat in Lebanon and in the occupied 
territories it was confronted with the rise of alternative political initiatives in the wake of the intifāda.4 
More generally, the new international order after the collapse of the Soviet Union was a decisive 
moment for many national movements including the PLO. The 1991 Gulf war was another breaking 
point because it altered the international and regional balance of power, putting the PLO in danger of 
being reduced to nothing more than a disintegrating and destitute bureaucracy located in Tunis. Its only 
aim was survival and its only claim to legitimacy was that it represented Palestinians (Bishara in Usher 
1995). After 1993, political disputes over the Oslo agreements further impeded the nationalist 
movement from meeting the expectations of its constituents.5 
 
The women’s movement’s public appeal reflected a particular political strategy. Instead of grounding its 
equality discourse on specific, exclusive gender rights, the movement communicated its message in the 
idiom of nationalism, state-building and democracy for which no national faction would disagree.6  
Its ability to enter the ‘monopolised public space’ (Bishara 1998) with new claims and demands allowed 
left- wing factions to reassert their presence in the political arena.7 In other words, advocating family law 
reform ‘opens up the possibility of new democratic alliance’ with these factions (Hammami and 
Johnson, 1999:337). The same factions which were apologetic vis-à-vis the Islamists during the first 
Intifada (1987-1991), now became supporters of the MP.  It was the social question posed by the MP, 
which the leftists had for a long time failed to advocate, that made possible a renewal engagement with 
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‘masses’. One leftist leader commented on the MP campaign, saying that “the [MP] was like a light and 
we had to respond” (Zakut, 1999, cited in Hammami and Johnson, 1999:335).  
Despite the ideological differences and heterogeneity within the women’s movement, a common 
element emerged, namely a shift towards the public questioning of gender relations. This process was 
paralleled by a gradual institutionalization of the women's movement itself through the establishment of 
women’s study centers and of grassroots organizations focusing on empowerment and awareness as 
well as the setting up of women’s departments within ministries. Further, a number of organizations 
established programs reflecting the importance of family law reform and the provision to women of 
adequate advice and counseling in matters of divorce, child custody, sexual abuse and violence in the 
domestic sphere.   
 
The women’s movement, while appearing in public as a body unified around the question of family law 
reform, was in fact subjected to a number of limitations. Power relations developed within it based on 
differences in locality, access to material resources or publicity, and the expression of divergences with 
mainstream discourse on family law. Unity vis-à-vis others was no more than a mantle hiding 
divergences of vision and over access to power resources. Such differences were marked by strong 
criticism and counter-criticism expressed in memos and meetings, but they did not emerge in public. 
The reasoning behind this consensus on hiding discord was that washing dirty linen in public would 
give the Islamists further ammunition and thus would not be in the interest of any organization. In this 
sense, the women’s movement had – at least – two facets: one of unity and harmony when encountering 
other political actors and the other marked by the exchange of invective within.   
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Model Parliament for Women and Legislation 
The activities and initiatives of the women’s movement culminated in the campaign for family law 
reform known as the Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (MP) in 1997-99. The MP project 
resulted from a four-year review of gender-based laws by a number of women’s organizations and 
human rights centers. Established in 1997, the MP project aimed to propose Palestinian legislation 
based on equality and human rights. The campaign for family law reform was viewed as the first major 
social debate in the history of Palestine. It engaged a wide spectrum of political and social groups. For 
the first time, political actors of diverse backgrounds and interests used Palestinian television stations, 
radio, newspapers and posters to communicate a politicized gender discourse.  
 
When the MP project started, its activities were organized in the West Bank by the Women’s Centre for 
Legal Aid and Counseling (WCLAC) which had taken the initiative and obtained funding for the project 
in both Gaza and the West Bank. However, when the Gazan MP preparatory committee (of which I 
was a member)8 received the proposed working manual from the West Bank, which was supposed to 
review all the gender-based laws implemented in Palestine, the committee found that no Gazan law had 
been considered.9 This generated a sense of frustration and anger among the members.10  The Gaza 
committee decided to ignore the West Bank manual entirely and design its activities according to what it 
described as ‘Gazan specificity’. It decided to focus on family law only and to leave other less 
controversial laws to be reviewed by the West Bank group. Not only the women’s movement, but all 
political actors, including Islamists, recognized the special significance of family law.  Further, instead of 
appealing to human rights conventions and international measures when presenting its proposed 
reforms, the Gaza committee worked from within the context of the sharī‘a.  It sought points of 
leverage by appealing to the principles of takhayyur (selection from different schools of fiqh), thinking 
that would prevent accusations of going beyond the boundaries of the sharī‘a. In this sense, the 
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suggestions made were not innovative.11 The reforms proposed by the Gaza MP were in many ways 
similar to, or even less ‘revolutionary’ than the laws already applied in other Arab countries. For 
example, it was suggested that women should be guaranteed their legally prescribed and religiously 
legitimate (shar‘īa) share of inheritance. Concerning the rights of the walī, the draft proposed activation 
of the already specified right of women to initiate their marriage contract as stipulated in the Book of 
Personal Status Rulings.12 Further, the MP committee proposed to limit polygyny to exceptional cases, 
to subject it to the authorization of a qādī and to require that both the first and the second wife be 
informed in advance.13 
 
Despite all the efforts to accommodate others’ perspectives, it appeared that they were not convinced of 
the MP’s sincerity. As one religious scholar put it, ‘We know that the MP use the sharī‘a as a mask to 
further their evil project. They use it for public consumption and that is worse than rejecting the sharī‘a 
squarely.14 
 
The suggestions for reform in Gaza were not top-down initiatives; rather, they were subject to 
discussion and negotiation within the preparatory committee and then the wider community. Often, 
certain suggestions for reform would be modified after a few rounds of debate. Even after a document 
was drafted, the plenary session of the MP in Gaza could modify certain proposals.15   At the MP, 
various approaches were recurrently presented by passionate activists. Some drew on personal 
experiences and others were inspired by feminist writings. Yet other activists were well-versed in law, 
fiqh or sharī‘a. Most had been active during the first intifāda as members of the nationalist movement. 
The majority perceived the MP as an exceptional platform for debating gender relations within the 
wider framework of national aspirations for independence and self-determination. Therefore, the Gazan 
leadership of the MP did its best to take advantage of the opportunity. For example, the seats in the 
 9 
parliament were divided equally between men and women.16 Attention was paid to maintaining social 
and political plurality so that the composition of the assembly would reflect the wider spectrum of 
Palestinian society. All political parties, civil society organizations, community figures, imams, Legislative 
Council members and religious leaders were invited to take part in the debate. During the preparatory 
meetings, members of Hamās, Jihād and national parties were invited, but the agenda for the meetings 
was prepared by the MP preparatory committee. 
 
Public meetings were held in various localities and communities, with invitations to all groups to join 
the discussions. The members of the parliament and its chairperson and deputies were elected through a 
democratic process. It was an exercise of community democracy in which women took the leading role.  
The chief campaigners of the MP asserted two principles: first, the need to guarantee the broadest 
possible participation of groups from various localities and political backgrounds; and second, while 
maintaining plurality, stronger political groups should be prevented from manipulating the campaign 
and thus diverting it from its objectives.17 
 
 On 25 April 1998, the final session of the MP began in Gaza. Hundreds of guests representing political 
parties, the Legislative Council, regional and international guests, international news agencies and 
socially recognized figures attended. As Welchman et al. point out, almost all the speakers affirmed the 
important role of women in the national struggle, as well as the right of free speech as fundamental to 
the nationalist project. Typically, women’s rights were linked to the modernist and nationalist project of 
state building. Nationalism was also evoked as a justification for legal reform, including personal status 
laws: the laws in force were repeatedly described as ‘foreign’ and imposed by occupying powers. When 
it came to the specifics of reform, however, most of the political leaders were either vague or somewhat 
conservative in their focus and recommendations (Welchman et al. 2002: 26). 
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During the final session, the MP members debated the measures that had been drafted by the 
committee and discussed in different localities and communities. At one point, while discussing a man’s 
right to marry more than one wife, the parliament members split into two camps. One advocated the 
man’s right to marry more than one wife, not with reference to the sharī‘a but to the politics of Islamic 
family law: ‘[If we opposed the right to marry more than one wife,] tomorrow we would appear in the 
newspapers as opponents of Islam and the sharī‘a and this would be an excellent weapon in the hands of 
the Islamists. We have to avoid that.’ The second camp advocated a ban on polygyny, arguing for 
radical social change: ‘If we keep compromising, we will never win.’ The man’s right to marry more than 
one wife was not at issue. Nor is polygyny a symbol of adherence to or divergence from Islam. The 
political and social price paid by those labeled as religiously or culturally ‘unauthentic’ was in fact the 
real issue. The proposal was won narrowly, with 42 for, 32 against, and 5 abstentions. 
 
The assembly members also disagreed over the issue of a walī’s rights. The MP’s draft document 
proposed that no marriage contracts should be initiated for persons under 18 and that the consent and 
signature of both spouses should be required. This proposal implied abolishing the walī’s prerogatives, 
which entitle the male guardian not only to sign the contract but, on some occasions, to decide who 
should marry whom. Here, the divisions were more complex. Astonishingly, some female members 
argued against the proposal, fearing the heavy social price the family would pay if its right to consent 
was not acknowledged in law: ‘How could we face our community if our children married without our 
blessing? That would not only be embarrassing, it would be disastrous,’ a communist female member 
protested. Another member agreed: ‘Our children’s marriage is the occasion on which we display our 
pride and dignity. What would remain to us if the law robbed us of it?’  One of the deputy chairpersons, 
a 65-year-old imām,18 who had maintained a dignified silence in the proceedings until then, could not 
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hold his tongue any more. ‘You will all pay for that; I swear in the name of God that I am against the 
fathers who take advantage of their rights as walī to coerce their daughters to marry or not to marry, but 
the proposal will inflict major harm on all of us including myself. Be smart and do not force the issue 
because this is a red line in our society.’ The proposal was not adopted. 
 
Two discourses had emerged during the year that led up to the opening of the MP. The first argued for 
termination of the existing power structure of marriage and its replacement with a relationship based on 
equality.19 The other insisted that any reform should preserve the Islamic quality of Palestinian 
legislation. Reform should be derived from the sharī‘a.20 They feared that overlooking the cultural, 
political and social connotations of Palestine’s Islamic identity would impact negatively on the women’s 
movement in the eyes of the wider society and give additional ammunition to its opponents. The 
profound change in the political atmosphere symbolized by the establishment of the PA brought 
intense and vibrant debate over what are defined by some as ‘inherited laws’. Novel appeals to various 
conceptions of citizenship intertwined with ambivalent statements of identity and various visions of 
state-building. 
 
In the Palestinian public sphere, the family law debate was both open and controlled. It was 
characterized by the inclusion of new participants and publics, yet various control mechanisms were 
imposed by powerful actors to silence certain identities, prohibit given subjects or impose chosen 
methods of deliberation (Moors 2003). Actors often shifted the debate from one domain to another. At 
certain moments, religious leaders, for example, asserted the right of ahl al-ikhtisās (religious specialists) 
to exclude specific participants from the process of deliberation. At others, they transferred the debate 
from the social and political domain to a more morally charged and religiously sensitive sphere. At yet 
others, they stirred the public up by stressing the danger of any reform of the family institution. The 
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articulation of arguments and the processes of exclusion or inclusion of subjects and identities were just 
indicators of how the power structure can compromise the course of deliberation, even in the absence 
of formal acts of exclusion (see Fraser 1993). 
 
The religious establishment influenced the debate through speeches in mosques, at public meetings, on 
television programs and in newspaper articles. Some qudāh kept their distance from Islamists, perhaps 
fearing that their attitude would be interpreted as a form of opposition to the newly established PA, 
while others were explicit in their association with the Islamists.  The above illustration is derived from 
my personal involvement in the campaign for family law reform in the Gaza Strip. The following 
characteristics of the debate on family law reform, however, apply to both the Gaza Strip and the West 
Bank. 
 
First, the question of who is allowed to speak about family law (in the public sphere) authoritatively and 
depict other voices as irrelevant was posed clearly: for example, the foremost religious figure in the 
counter-campaign was Shaykh Bitāwī, who was well known in the West Bank for his vocal opposition 
to the women’s movement. His intervention was sparked off at an MP meeting conducted by a human 
rights specialist in Nablus in early March 1998. During the session, Shaykh Bitāwī objected to her 
discussion of family law on the grounds that she was a ‘Christian’ interfering in ‘issues that concern 
Muslims’. ‘We do not interfere in your religion and you should not interfere in our legislation,’ he told 
her.21  
 
Second, the issue of who is allowed to speak was intertwined with the question of representation. In an 
article on 26 March 1998, Shaykh Jarrār denounced the MP activists as misrepresenting Palestinian 
women’s needs and aspirations: ‘There are a number of figures who claim that they represent 
 13 
Palestinian women. They should let the Palestinian nation decide who should talk in its name. 22In the 
same issue of the al-Ayyām newspaper, Shaykh Jarrār wrote a reply to a communiqué by the General 
Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) which had denounced the campaign launched in the mosques 
against Palestinian women ‘who participated in the struggle and made every sacrifice for liberation and 
independence.’23 He wrote, ‘We request the GUPW not to talk in the name of Palestinian women and 
not to use Palestinian women’s struggle to impose the opinions of some figures. The GUPW is allowed 
to sign in the name of its members only when all members sign its communiqués.’24 
 
The above example is better analyzed if it is linked with the religious leaders’ discourse regarding the 
issue of special competence ‘ahl al-ikhtisās’. The claim that only the religious leaders have the required 
competence aimed at excluding women activists from the debate.  In an interview published on 5 
March, Shaykh Bitāwī launched a fierce attack on the MP, denouncing its attempts to exclude religious 
jurists from the debate: ‘The MP is administered by culturally alienated women who have no connection 
with our Islamic sharī‘a. Ahl al-ikhtisās (specialists) like qudāh and professors of sharī‘a […] and rijāl al-iftā’ 
[religious jurists], who have worked for decades, are kept away.’25 In another interview, Shaykh Bitāwī 
asked: ‘If they claim that they want to work from within the sharī‘a, why did they not consult us? We are 
the specialists (ahl al-ikhtisās), not they!’26 
 
Third, various religious leaders felt that their hold on the sharī‘a courts, and thus their interests, were 
threatened by the MP proposal to replace the sharī‘a with nizāmiyya (civil) courts. It is in such incidents 
that the struggle over authority and institutional power is noticeably revealed. A striking element in the 
religious establishment’s response was the accusation that sharī‘a courts were being treated as an 
administrative rather than a religious institution. In an interview, Shaykh Bitāwī, head of the sharī‘a 
Court of Appeal, said: ‘The MP activists are working against the sharī‘a since they propose that nizāmiyya 
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courts should replace the sharī‘a court in issues related to marriage, custody and divorce. This implies a 
cancellation and elimination of the sharī‘a court’.27 Other religious leaders also expressed anger over the 
proposal to transfer the mandate of the sharī‘a courts to civil courts. On 26 March, Shaykh Mahmūd 
Salāmeh, a qādī in the Gaza City sharī‘a courts who later became the deputy qādī al-qudāh and has close 
ties with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority, told a meeting at the Islamic University of Gaza: ‘The 
most dangerous issue in the MP is its proposal to rule on personal status issues in the nizāmiyya instead 
of the sharī‘a courts.28  
 
Fourth, in addressing the public, the style of arguments was indicative: religious leaders did not only 
count on physical intimidation, they also labeled the MP proposals anti-Islamic. Their discourse of 
family ethos based on love and compassion was charged with nationalist sentiment and appeals to 
Palestinian masculinity. The following extract from a newspaper interview with Shaykh Jarrār is an 
example of how Palestinian masculinity is invoked:  
The MP wants to humiliate men; the problem is not political, but religious. The MP proposals pertain 
to our lives and families … The MP proposals start from ‘equality’, a notion of Western origin. We 
accept the ‘equality’ notion, but it should be clear that its definition and conceptualization have to be 
given in the framework of Islam, which grants women better rights than the West. What the MP 
presents is against the sharī‘a and the Quran as well as the will of the ‘ulamā’. 
 
Shaykh Jarrār then employed the Islamists’ favorite tactic against the MP, linking it with Western 
enemies of Islam: ‘They are supported by Western funds; they want to enforce the Western concepts 
and Western lifestyle over our lives and civilization.’ Commenting on the women’s struggle against 
occupation, he said, ‘All the Palestinian people participated in the struggle against Israel, not only 
women’s groups … their participation does not give them the right to rebel against sharī‘a’ (cited in 
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Hamdan 1998: 4). A few days later, Shaykh ‘Ammār Badawī, the muftī of Nablus, declared that the MP’s 
suggestions were intended to destroy the Palestinian family, an objective that even the Israelis had not 
achieved.29  
 
Fifth, the competing camps were not unified. Even within the religious establishment, some voices 
appeared less convinced by the above discourse. For example, Shaykh Zuhayr al-Dib‘ī, an imām at the 
largest mosque in Nablus and a member of the MP, told Al-Ayyām: 
The personal status code is not the monopoly of ahl al-ikhtisās. Every citizen is affected by it and 
consequently all of us should discuss it. As a citizen, I have four daughters and I am concerned about 
their future. As a preacher, the law concerns me. They [those who attack the MP] depicted the MP 
campaign as if it were an attempt to assassinate the sharī‘a. This is not true. This is a dangerous charge 
against our sisters and against us as MP members. The sharī‘a is the same everywhere, but each country 
has to codify it according to its circumstances. What we wanted to do is to protect Islam from the 
abuses perpetrated in its name. Some men marry a second wife the same way they buy another car, 
which is not Islamic.30 
 
The need for reform was also addressed by Dr. Hasan al-Jūjū, a practicing qādī, in an article on 16 
March 1998 that offered a careful examination of family law, its origin and the reasons motivating its 
reform (Welchman 2003 analyses al-Jūjū’s position at length). He is possibly the only qādī who provided 
a balanced account of what could be done and how. In his view, family law should be reformed to meet 
the needs of contemporary life. He quoted qādī Ibn ‘Abdīn and Caliph ‘Umar bin ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to justify 
the legitimacy of reform: ‘It has become very important to reform the personal status laws in all the 
Palestinian territories and to unify them by eliciting the proper measures from the four fiqh schools and 
selecting from among them the ones that meet people’s interests (masālih) and correspond to the spirit 
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of the time. This could be done within the flexible and fertile framework of Islamic legislation. We 
should follow the methodology of selection (takhayyur) because confining ourselves to one madhhab has 
shown that there are dispositions that do not meet the requirements of contemporary life. If ijtihād does 
not rely on nass (holy text) it is often derived from ‘urf (custom). And in this case, ijtihād should be 
treated as an opinion which might be wrong or right,’ he wrote.31 However, qādī al-Jūjū was firm about 
his rejection of certain changes suggested by the MP: ‘The voices that demand equality in inheritance 
and the cancellation of men’s qiwāma (precedence) over women should be denied and denounced 
because they cause fitna (discord) and they declare an aggression against our religion and civilization,’ he 
concluded.32 
 
These differences in viewpoint show that the religious establishment is not a monolithic institution. 
There are those who construct their discourse on mere ideology, motivated by their politico-economic 
interests, and those who take a practical stance due to their daily contact with the problems and 
dilemmas of people in matters of personal status. These differences demonstrate the importance of 
taking into consideration the attitudes of practitioners: when they become involved in the debate, they 
often express more balanced and concrete views. This stance, as Masud (2001) argues, indicates that the 
normative basis of law lies not in the debate but elsewhere; it is in the social reality which has been 
disregarded by both camps. Masud (2001: 5) points out that the current debate in the Muslim world 
regarding the role of Islamic law indicates the existence and persistence of three levels of contradiction: 
(i) The political conceptualization of the sharī‘a is based on a moral stance while law is likely to be more 
pragmatic. (ii) On the social level, women suffer from the contradictions between the ideals of the 
sharī‘a and the social norms. (iii) On the religious level, a contradiction between legal norms and Islamic 
ethical values still exists. While practitioners throughout Islamic history have tried to reconcile social 
norms and Islamic law by invoking principles of necessity, convenience, preventive measures, state of 
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emergency, and so forth, contradictions persist because these measures have not been incorporated as 
‘norms’ in legal theory. 
 
The women’s movement and its supporters structured their arguments in the framework of nation-
building, democracy and freedom of speech. The Christian Human Rights specialist who was attacked 
by Shaykh Bitāwī even claimed her right to ijtihād on the basis of being a Palestinian activist at the 
national as well as community levels: ‘No one should say that I am not from ahl al-ikhtisās. I have the 
right, just as any other Palestinian, to debate the law and propose alternatives. We have a right to 
exercise ijtihād because we work with women, live in Palestinian society and struggle to build our 
Palestinian society. We have the right to speak because we are legal specialists.’ 
 
The campaign continued and more actors joined the debate. Academics from Birzeit University wrote 
articles and produced programmes on Palestinian television in favor of the MP. The majority of 
Legislative Council members expressed their sympathy with the MP campaign in newspaper interviews 
and by attending MP sessions. Several lawyers expressed diverse attitudes and arguments. Almost 
everyday, articles appeared in the newspapers dedicated to the issue of personal status. Arguments and 
counter-arguments were put forward from various quarters. Some groups in the Gaza Strip (and the 
West Bank) used other means of publicity. The walls, which had been freshly painted after the arrival of 
the PA, were taken over by some groups as a legitimate public space to convey their agreement or 
disagreement with the MP. Some MP posters were replaced by hand-written statements denouncing 
what they termed an attack on ‘Islam and the sharī‘a’ and threatening MP members. In this sense, 
laypeople were actively engaged in the debate not only through usual forums, such as active discussion 
in seminars or workshops, but also by voicing their opinions through all available avenues. The 
Palestinian public sphere hosted conflicting and competing publics (see Fraser 1993, Eley 1993) as it 
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witnessed one of its most intense debates ever. Family law had sharply divided Palestinians into at least 
two camps: those who supported pluralism and freedom of expression and those who aimed at 
monopolizing sharī‘a and Islam. 
 
A survey conducted by the women’s study program of Birzeit University showed that the question of 
reform responds to highly conflicting interests and values. The analysts demonstrate that while 
respondents are committed to equality and justice, these sentiments co-exist with their desire to 
preserve gender hierarchy within the family (Welchman et al. 2002). In a similar vein, contradictory 
attitudes exist with regard to legal reform. People believe that they have the right to determine what 
religious law should be, but, simultaneously, they favor expanding the role of religious authorities. The 
study concluded that these contradictions may obtain within each individual. Legal reform should thus 
take into consideration not only notions of equality, but also other controversial values and interests. 
Before concluding, I would like to mention that the strong apposition led the women’s movement to 
decide (after the Model Parliament completed its activities) to work on the question of family law 
reform by following a different strategy. In particular, activists opted for ‘low-key’ lobbying instead of 
a loud popular campaign. This meant that the focus was on activities such as meeting with politicians, 
lobbying decision-makers, influencing Legislative Council members, and so forth, in order to muster 
wide political support for its new family law draft. This strategy was meant to counteract that of 
Islamists and religious leaders, who have better access to the public thanks to better means of 
communication and a discourse that invokes people’s religious and cultural heritage. The women’s 
movement lacked this capacity to communicate with the public. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the identity and positions of the participants in the debates, the way they 
conceptualized family law and the idioms they used to communicate their positions. The main factor 
affecting any activity in Palestine is the Israeli occupation. Checkpoints on Palestinian territory prevent 
the free movement of goods and people. Settlements, in conjunction with these barricades, fragment 
the population and land. With Israel controlling Palestinian internal revenue, the Palestinian Authority 
has limited power and resources at its disposal. Thus, the need for independence and self-determination 
overshadows everything else.  These conditions explain why Palestinian public discussion on family law 
differs from that conducted in other Arab countries. Whereas debate in the latter reflects tension 
between the state and civil society, the Palestinian debate has developed in the context of the national 
struggle for liberation and state-building. Thus, in Palestine, not only is the question of who may claim 
the right to interpret the sources of law central, but so is the clash between appeals for reinforcing equal 
citizenship rights as opposed to cultural and religious specificities in the framework of the national 
struggle for independence. This aspect has influenced participants’ discourse and shaped their 
argumentations. They often refer to the substance of family law, yet frequently argue with reference to 
nationalism and state-building.  
 
With this in mind, the chapter analyzed the Model Parliament for Women and Legislation (MP) which 
was the climactic focus of the debate on reforming family law in Palestine. The MP was a popular 
exercise to analyze and recommend changes to the law. Five main features were observed: First, the 
question of who is allowed to speak about family law authoritatively while depicting other voices as 
irrelevant was posed clearly. Second, the women’s movement and the religious establishment were not 
unified. While the Gaza MP based its discourse on sharī‘a by stretching the principle of takhayyur to its 
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utmost limits, the West Bank MP referred to the principles of human rights. The religious 
establishment, for its part, did not emerge as a monolithic bloc; some of its members did realize the 
need to remedy certain gender-based injustices of family law. Third, analogously to the debate in other 
Arab countries, the Palestinian discussion appeared both open and controlled; open in that it included 
new participants and publics, yet controlled in that powerful actors silenced certain identities, prohibited 
given subjects or imposed chosen methods of deliberation (see Moors 2003). Fourth, significant among 
the controlling mechanisms was the strategy of both opponents and supporters of reform in shifting the 
domains of debate from one sphere to another. Religious leaders in some instances asserted the right of 
ahl al-ikhtisās (specialists) to exclude particular actors from the process of deliberation; in other 
instances, they transferred the debate from the social domain to the political or entered a more morally 
charged and religiously sensitive sphere. Still, they always stressed the danger that reform would pose 
for the institution of the family. The women’s movement (in both Gaza and the West Bank), in 
contrast, was less successful in shifting course. The main thrust of its discourse was to articulate gender 
needs and interests in idioms related to nationalism, state-building and democracy. This strategy was 
generated from the movement’s conscious attempt to locate its arguments around issues less related to 
sexuality and sexual rights (see Peteet 1999) which family law regulates.  
 
The year-long discussions and deliberations were a marathon social exercise not only for the women’s 
movement but also for other social actors. Family law reform was a political project in which diverging 
assumptions about the role of the sharī‘a, Islam and gender were put forward as an expression of the 
‘social will’ (Hammami 2004: 126) that each group claimed to represent. The chapter showed the extent 
to which such debates can be divisive.  
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1 See Moors (1999) which compares the text of family law with social practice in the Arab world, and Moors 
(2003) which explores various positions, styles and modes of argumentation that appeared in the 1990s. 
Welchman’s contribution to Moors (2003) reviews the debate in Palestine, whereas her previous work 
(Welchman et al. 2002) assesses the legislative and lobbying initiatives related to Islamic law. Welchman (2000) 
further examines both the debate and application of family law in the West Bank from a legal perspective. 
Buskens (2003) links the debate on family law with the emergence of a public sphere in Morocco and the 
struggle of various political actors for legitimacy and power. Shaham (1999) examines Islamic marriage 
contracts in Egypt. Mir-Hosseini (2000a) compares the application of family law in Iran and Morocco. 
Moghadam (2001) studies the emergence of Islamist feminists and their engagement in the reform debate. 
Wurth (2003) deals with Yemen and shows which perspectives emerge from the different positionalities of 
women. Hammami and Johnson (1999), Sh’hada (1999) analyse the Model Parliament for Women and 
Legislation in Palestine. 
2 This was still true of the situation at the end of 2004, before the announcement of the Israeli intention to 
withdraw from Gaza and to close down four west Bank settlements. At the same time, some West Bank 
settlements were being expanded with official Israeli permission, so it remains to be seen whether such a 
withdrawal, if actually carried out, is merely meant to legitimize permanent status for and expansion of the 
remaining settlements in the West Bank. 
3 Women’s involvement in the national struggle has been extensively researched in the last two decades. 
Researchers have focused on investigating whether the national struggle provides sufficient room for women’s 
emancipation or presents an obstacle to it. Most feminist scholars have confirmed that national movements are 
predominantly patriarchal and that women are often co-opted during national struggles. Palestinian nationalism, 
as Peteet (1999: 71) observes, is characterized by ‘contradictory potential’. On the one hand, it acknowledges 
the multiplicity of women’s positionalities; on the other, it has ‘denied them the status of either independent 
agency [and has not] accept[ed] them as a basis from which to launch political organizing’. For reasons related 
to the scope and focus of this study, I will not review the history of the women’s movement in Palestine. There 
is, however, a vast amount of literature concerning particular sections of Palestinian women’s activism, often 
linked with the secular national movement. See, for example, Peteet 1999, 1991, Hiltermann 1991, Jad 1995, 
Abdo 1999, Hammami 1990, Hammami and Kuttab 1999, Sayigh 1993, Ameri 1999, Dajani 1994, Gluck 1997, 
Sharoni 2001, Abdulhadi 1998 and Kuttab 1993. For literature related to the question of women and 
nationalism in the Third World, see, for example, Kandiyoti 1991 and 1997, Joseph 1991 and 1986, Badran 
1993, Molyneux 2001 and 1998, Hatem 1993, Jayawardena 1989, Chatterjee 1993 and Mohanty et al. 1991. For 
a more general theorization on women and nationalism, see, for example, Yuval-Davis 1992 and 1997, Pettman 
1996 and Walby 1996 
4 The intifāda (meaning ‘uprising’) was a mass protest against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. 
It started in December 1987 and continued until the beginning of the so-called ‘peace process’ initiated by the 
U.S. after the Iraqi defeat in the Gulf war of 1991. It shifted from mass-based actions to prolonged, 
institutionalized actions. The main objective of the uprising was to exhaust rather than evict the occupying 
power through a combination of local and international pressure. The most remarkable features of the intifāda 
were not only the participation of Palestinians from all sectors and classes but also the ease with which 
mobilization was carried out and support structure built within a few months of its eruption (Hiltermann 1991). 
5 For more details on the Oslo agreements, see Usher 1995. 
6 Peteet (1999) points out that this specific strategy of Palestinian women emanates from their deliberate 
attempt to locate their arguments within the human rights and democracy paradigm rather than around issues 
related to sexuality. 
7 Bishara (1998) argues that the post-Oslo period witnessed a growing demobilization of political activities in 
the West Bank and Gaza due to the multiplication of security services by the PA. 
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8 The members were selected on the basis of ‘democratic’ election among the activists of civil society 
organisation. More than three months of preparations were spent in deliberations and discussion to 
find the proper form on the basis of which the committee should be ‘elected’, its mandate, 
responsibilities and representation.  
9 The manual, written by a Jordanian lawyer familiar with the West Bank legal system and laws, was: A. Khadr 
(1998) Al-qanūn wa al-mustaqbal al-marā’ al-falastīniyya (Law and the Future of Palestinian Women). Jerusalem: 
WCLAC and UNDP. 
10 Gazans often feel that West Bankers treat them with certain arrogance. There are historical reasons for this, 
but it is beyond the scope of this study to go into them. 
11 The final text proposed the age of marriage to be set at 18 for men and women; abolition of the institution of 
guardianship; alimony (nafaqa) should be paid from the date of separation; legal rights of inheritance should be 
protected by the state; state-regulated polygyny; husbands’ second marriage should be for ‘serious’ reasons for 
which the first wife should be informed; instead of unilateral divorce, the course should be the decision-maker; 
mothers’ renunciation of their custody rights should not be accepted; custody decisions should apply to children 
up to the age of 18; the best interests of children should be the guiding principle for deciding custody cases 
(Nashwan 1998). 
12 The Book of Personal Status Rulings According to the School of Abū Hanīfa compiled by Qadrī Pāshā of 
1875 specified that the bāligh (mature woman) does not need the permission of a walī to initiate her marriage 
contract. This article is derived from the Hanafī school of thought. Article 34 states that ‘the walī is a condition 
for the legitimacy of under-age men and women’ (al- walī shart li-sihhat nikāh al-saghīr wa al-saghīra) and ‘the walī is 
not a condition for the legitimacy of the marriage of free, mature and bāligh [men and women]’ (wa laysa al- walī 
shartan li nikāh al-hur wa al-hurra al-‘āqilayn al-bālighayn), their marriage is valid without a walī (bal yanfuth nikāhahuma 
bila walī). 
13 For more information, see K. Nashwan (1998) ‘Muqtadayāt li-qanūn ahwāl shakhsiyya falastīnī muwahhad’ 
(‘Requirements for a Unified Palestinian Personal Status Law’), Discussion Paper, Model Parliament for 
Women and Legislation.  
14 Abū Sibbah, Shaykh ‘Attā Allāh during a public discussion, 1998. He is professor of Islamic Studies at the 
Islamic University of Gaza. 
15 The suggestions for reform are summarized in K. Nashwan (1998). 
16 The symbolic number of seats was initially equivalent to that of Legislative Council members, 88, but was 
then increased to 120 due to the number of people wanting to participate. In the West Bank, the central session 
maintained the number of seats at 88. 
17 ‘Stronger political groups’, in this study is a reference to the PA leading political party (Fatah) and its Islamist 
rival (Hamās). 
18 Imām means the leader of the congregation prayer. 
19 This view was expressed mostly by NGO members, for the most part funded by Western NGOs, who 
adopted the mainstream discourse of human rights and democracy. 
20 This view was by and large adopted by the activists of the General Union of Palestinian Women. Most of 
them were members of the ruling party, who on the one hand stressed the need for reform, and on the other 
hesitated to antagonize the Islamists.  
21 Al-Ayyām, 19 March 1998. 
22 Al-Ayyām, 26 March 1998. 
23 GUPW communiqué, published in Al-Ayyām, 25 March 1998. 
24 Al-Ayyām, 26 March 1998.  
25 Al-Risāla weekly, 5 March 1998. 
26 Al-Hayāt al-jadīda, 19 March 1998. 
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27 Al-Ayyām, ibid.  
28 Al-Hayāt al-jadīda daily newspaper, 26 March 1998. 
29 Al-Quds daily newspaper, 18 March 1998. 
30 Al-Ayyām, 21 March 1998. 
31 Al-Ayyām, 16 March 1998. 
32 Al-Ayyām, 16 March 1998. 
 
